Phaidros leads Sokrates to an idyllic spot connected with Nymph worship and reads a speech by Lysias on why men who don’t love each other are better for each other than lovers. Sokrates responds with a story of a man who tries to seduce a beautiful boy by claiming not to be in love with him, then interrupts himself.
[S. …] Well then, my dear Phaidros, do you think, as I do myself, that I have experienced something divine?
P. Very much so, Sokrates; an unusual fluency has taken hold of you.
S. Then be quiet and listen to me. For the place seems truly inspired by a god, so don’t be surprised if I perhaps become seized by the Nymphs (νυμφόληπτος) as the speech progresses. You see at the moment I’m almost on the point of breaking out into dithyrambs. […]
Sokrates continues, turns the story into a lecture critical of love and lovers, and concludes with a saying in dactylic hexameter verse, but Phaidros pleads for more.
P. […] Come on then, Sokrates, why are you stopping?
S. Haven’t you realized, my dear friend, that I’m now uttering verses, but not dithyrambs any more, even though I’m speaking critically? But if I start to praise the other man, what do you think I shall do? Do you already realize that I’ll clearly be enraptured (ἐνθουσιάσω) by the Nymphs to whom you have knowingly exposed me? […]
Sokrates continues, but says his guardian spirit forces him to change his stance on love.
S. When I was about to cross the river, my good friend, there was a divine signal that has ever been with me – it’s always restraining me from what I’m about to do – and I seemed to hear a voice from the very spot, which does not allow me to go away before I have made atonement for having offended against the divine. Now, I am a prophet, not a very serious one, but like those who are weak at letters, just competent enough for my own needs. Therefore I already clearly understand what I’ve done wrong. […]
[S. …] The speech must go as follows: that the story is not true which says that when a lover is around you should bestow your favors instead on the one who is not in love, just because the one is mad and the other sound in mind. For if it was simply that madness is an evil thing, it would be right to say so. But as it is, the greatest of good things come to us through madness: the sort, mind you, which is given as a divine gift. For both the prophetess in Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona when in a mad frenzy have performed many good services for Greece, both in private and in public matters, but have done little or nothing when they’re in their right senses. And if we say that the Sybil and others who, by practicing god-inspired (ἐνθέῳ) prophecy and foretelling many things to many people, have set them straight regarding the future, we would protract matters by saying things which are obvious to everyone. […]
And further, in the case of the greatest ills and sufferings which come about among certain families as a result of some long-standing divine anger, the madness, when it arises in them and provides interpretation, finds a remedy for those in need by resorting to prayers and worship of the gods; from which it chances upon purifications and rituals and brings the afflicted one out of danger both for the present and the future, discovering for the one who is truly mad and possessed (κατασχομένῳ) a release from his existing troubles.
The third kind of possession (κατοκωχή) and madness comes from the Muses, seizing (λαβοῦσα) a delicate, virginal soul, rousing and exciting it to Bacchic frenzy in lyric and other forms of poetry, and by embellishing countless deeds of men of old it educates their successors. But whoever has approached the gates of poetry without the madness of the Muses, being convinced he’ll actually be a competent poet as a result of his art, he himself, uninitiated, together with his poetry, that of a man of sound mind, are eclipsed in the face of that of those who are mad. […]
All soul is immortal. […]
So how a living being is called immortal and mortal we must now try to explain. All soul has the care of everything soulless, and travels around all the heavens appearing in different forms at different times. Now when it’s perfectly winged it travels through the heavens and governs the whole universe, but the one that is stripped of its wings is carried along until it gets hold of something solid where, once settled and taking on an earthly body, it appears to move itself by itself because of the power of the soul, and the whole thing is called a living creature, soul and body joined together, and it gets the name “mortal”; […]
This then is why only the mind of a philosopher justly becomes winged. For through his memory as far as he can, he is always close to those things a god’s closeness to which makes him divine. The man then who makes proper use of such reminders, and being continually initiated into perfect mysteries, alone becomes truly perfect. But in standing aside from human pursuits and getting close to the divine he is reproached by most people for being out of his mind, whereas the majority fail to realize he is enraptured (ἐνθουσιάζων) by a god.
Now it is to this point that the whole of my argument about the fourth kind of madness has been coming – which, when someone sees beauty here, and recalling the true beauty, starts to grow wings and getting his feathers back is eager to fly up, but being unable to, looking upward like a bird, and with no regard for what is below, is accused of being in a state of madness – I conclude that this actually turns out to be both the best of all the kinds of divine enrapture (ἐνθουσιάσεων), and comes from the best source for him who has it and shares it, and that in sharing in this madness the lover of things beautiful is called a lover. […]
So indeed those who are followers of Zeus are seeking that the one who is loved by them should be like Zeus in his soul. And so then they look to see if he is naturally a philosopher and leader, and when they find him and fall in love with him, they do everything to make him so. If then they haven’t embarked upon this path before, they take the matter up now and learn from any source they can and pursue it themselves; and in tracing it from within themselves they succeed in discovering the nature of their own god through being forced to look intensely in the direction of the god, and grasping him through their memory they are possessed (ἐνθουσιῶντες) and take from him their character and habits as far as it’s possible for a human being to share in a god. Indeed, because they hold their loved one responsible for these things they love him even more, and if it is from Zeus that they draw, like the followers of Bacchus they pour it out over their loved one’s soul and make him as much like their own god as possible. […]
After the conclusion of this speech, Sokrates and Phaidros converse again, during which Sokrates adds this about divine possession.
[S. …] For we said that love is a kind of madness. Isn’t that so?
P. Yes.
S. And that there are two forms of madness: one from human illnesses, and the other from the divine altering our customary behavior.
P. Very much so.
S. And of divine madness, four shares were divided among four gods: oracular inspiration (ἐπίπνοιαν) went to Apollo, mystic rites to Dionysos, poetic in turn to the Muses, and the fourth to Aphrodite and Eros […]
Author: Plato
Title of Work: Phaidros
Location in Work: 238c-d, 241d-e, 242b-c, 244a-b, 244d-245a, 245c, 246b-c, 249c-e, 252e-253a, 265a-b
Date of Work: c. 375 BCE
Original Language: Greek (Attic)
Original Text:
[ΣΩ. ...] Ἀτάρ, ὦ φίλε Φαῖδρε, δοκῶ τι σοί, ὥσπερ ἐμαυτῷ, θεῖον πάθος πεπονθέναι;
ΦΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς εὔροιά τίς σε εἴληφεν.
ΣΩ. Σιγῇ τοίνυν μου ἄκουε. dτῷ ὄντι γὰρ θεῖος ἔοικεν ὁ τόπος εἶναι, ὥστε ἐὰν ἄρα πολλάκις νυμφόληπτος προϊόντος τοῦ λόγου γένωμαι, μὴ θαυμάσῃς· τὰ νῦν γὰρ οὐκέτι πόρρω διθυράμβων φθέγγομαι. [...]
[...]
[ΦΑΙ. ...] νῦν δὲ δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, τί ἀποπαύῃ;
ΣΩ. Οὐκ ᾔσθου, ὦ μακάριε, ὅτι ἤδη ἔπη φθέγγομαι ἀλλ’ οὐκέτι διθυράμβους, καὶ ταῦτα ψέγων; ἐὰν δ’ ἐπαινεῖν τὸν ἕτερον ἄρξωμαι, τί με οἴει ποιήσειν; ἆρ’ οἶσθ’ ὅτι ὑπὸ τῶν Νυμφῶν, αἷς με σὺ προύβαλες ἐκ προνοίας, σαφῶς ἐνθουσιάσω; [...]
[...]
ΣΩ. Ἡνίκ’ ἔμελλον, ὠγαθέ, τὸν ποταμὸν διαβαίνειν, τὸ δαιμόνιόν τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖόν μοι γίγνεσθαι ἐγένετο – ἀεὶ δέ με ἐπίσχει ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν – καί τινα φωνὴν ἔδοξα αὐτόθεν ἀκοῦσαι, ἥ με οὐκ ἐᾷ ἀπιέναι πρὶν ἂν ἀφοσιώσωμαι, ὡς δή τι ἡμαρτηκότα εἰς τὸ θεῖον. εἰμὶ δὴ οὖν μάντις μέν, οὐ πάνυ δὲ σπουδαῖος, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ γράμματα φαῦλοι, ὅσον μὲν ἐμαυτῷ μόνον ἱκανός· σαφῶς οὖν ἤδη μανθάνω τὸ ἁμάρτημα. [...]
[...]
[ΣΩ. ...] λεκτέος δὲ ὧδε, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστ’ ἔτυμος λόγος ὃς ἂν παρόντος ἐραστοῦ τῷ μὴ ἐρῶντι μᾶλλον φῇ δεῖν χαρίζεσθαι, διότι δὴ ὁ μὲν μαίνεται, ὁ δὲ σωφρονεῖ. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἁπλοῦν τὸ μανίαν κακὸν εἶναι, καλῶς ἂν ἐλέγετο· νῦν δὲ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν γίγνεται διὰ μανίας, θείᾳ μέντοι δόσει διδομένης. ἥ τε γὰρ δὴ ἐν Δελφοῖς προφῆτις αἵ τ’ ἐν Δωδώνῃ ἱέρειαι μανεῖσαι μὲν πολλὰ δὴ καὶ καλὰ ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἠργάσαντο, σωφρονοῦσαι δὲ βραχέα ἢ οὐδέν· καὶ ἐὰν δὴ λέγωμεν Σίβυλλάν τε καὶ ἄλλους, ὅσοι μαντικῇ χρώμενοι ἐνθέῳ πολλὰ δὴ πολλοῖς προλέγοντες εἰς τὸ μέλλον ὤρθωσαν, μηκύνοιμεν ἂν δῆλα παντὶ λέγοντες. [...]
ἀλλὰ μὴν νόσων γε καὶ πόνων τῶν μεγίστων, ἃ δὴ παλαιῶν ἐκ μηνιμάτων ποθὲν ἔν τισι τῶν γενῶν ἡ μανία ἐγγενομένη καὶ προφητεύσασα, οἷς ἔδει ἀπαλλαγὴν ηὕρετο, καταφυγοῦσα πρὸς θεῶν εὐχάς τε καὶ λατρείας, ὅθεν δὴ καθαρμῶν τε καὶ τελετῶν τυχοῦσα ἐξάντη ἐποίησε τὸν [ἑαυτῆς] ἔχοντα πρός τε τὸν παρόντα καὶ τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον, λύσιν τῷ ὀρθῶς μανέντι τε καὶ κατασχομένῳ τῶν παρόντων κακῶν εὑρομένη.
τρίτη δὲ ἀπὸ Μουσῶν κατοκωχή τε καὶ μανία, λαβοῦσα ἁπαλὴν καὶ ἄβατον ψυχήν, ἐγείρουσα καὶ ἐκβακχεύουσα κατά τε ᾠδὰς καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ποίησιν, μυρία τῶν παλαιῶν ἔργα κοσμοῦσα τοὺς ἐπιγιγνομένους παιδεύει· ὃς δ’ ἂν ἄνευ μανίας Μουσῶν ἐπὶ ποιητικὰς θύρας ἀφίκηται, πεισθεὶς ὡς ἄρα ἐκ τέχνης ἱκανὸς ποιητὴς ἐσόμενος, ἀτελὴς αὐτός τε καὶ ἡ ποίησις ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν μαινομένων ἡ τοῦ σωφρονοῦντος ἠφανίσθη. [...]
Ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος. τὸ γὰρ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον· [...]
πῇ δὴ οὖν θνητόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον ζῷον ἐκλήθη πειρατέον εἰπεῖν. ψυχὴ πᾶσα παντὸς ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀψύχου, πάντα δὲ οὐρανὸν περιπολεῖ, ἄλλοτ’ ἐν ἄλλοις εἴδεσι γιγνομένη. τελέα μὲν οὖν οὖσα καὶ ἐπτερωμένη μετεωροπορεῖ τε καὶ πάντα τὸν κόσμον διοικεῖ, cἡ δὲ πτερορρυήσασα φέρεται ἕως ἂν στερεοῦ τινος ἀντιλάβηται, οὗ κατοικισθεῖσα, σῶμα γήϊνον λαβοῦσα, αὐτὸ αὑτὸ δοκοῦν κινεῖν διὰ τὴν ἐκείνης δύναμιν, ζῷον τὸ σύμπαν ἐκλήθη, ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα παγέν, θνητόν τ’ ἔσχεν ἐπωνυμίαν· [...]
διὸ δὴ δικαίως μόνη πτεροῦται ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια· πρὸς γὰρ ἐκείνοις ἀεί ἐστιν μνήμῃ κατὰ δύναμιν, πρὸς οἷσπερ θεὸς ὢν θεῖός ἐστιν. τοῖς δὲ δὴ τοιούτοις ἀνὴρ ὑπομνήμασιν ὀρθῶς χρώμενος, τελέους ἀεὶ τελετὰς τελούμενος, τέλεος ὄντως μόνος γίγνεται· ἐξιστάμενος δὲ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων σπουδασμάτων καὶ πρὸς τῷ θείῳ γιγνόμενος, νουθετεῖται μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὡς παρακινῶν, ἐνθουσιάζων δὲ λέληθεν τοὺς πολλούς.
Ἔστι δὴ οὖν δεῦρο ὁ πᾶς ἥκων λόγος περὶ τῆς τετάρτης μανίας – ἣν ὅταν τὸ τῇδέ τις ὁρῶν κάλλος, τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενος, πτερῶταί τε καὶ ἀναπτερούμενος προθυμούμενος ἀναπτέσθαι, ἀδυνατῶν δέ, ὄρνιθος δίκην βλέπων ἄνω, τῶν κάτω δὲ ἀμελῶν, αἰτίαν ἔχει ὡς μανικῶς διακείμενος – ὡς ἄρα αὕτη πασῶν τῶν ἐνθουσιάσεων ἀρίστη τε καὶ ἐξ ἀρίστων τῷ τε ἔχοντι καὶ τῷ κοινωνοῦντι αὐτῆς γίγνεται, καὶ ὅτι ταύτης μετέχων τῆς μανίας ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν καλῶν ἐραστὴς καλεῖται. [...]
οἱ μὲν δὴ οὖν Διὸς δῖόν τινα εἶναι ζητοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν τὸν ὑφ’ αὑτῶν ἐρώμενον· σκοποῦσιν οὖν εἰ φιλόσοφός τε καὶ ἡγεμονικὸς τὴν φύσιν, καὶ ὅταν αὐτὸν εὑρόντες ἐρασθῶσι, πᾶν ποιοῦσιν ὅπως τοιοῦτος ἔσται. ἐὰν οὖν μὴ πρότερον ἐμβεβῶσι τῷ ἐπιτηδεύματι, τότε ἐπιχειρήσαντες μανθάνουσί τε ὅθεν ἄν τι δύνωνται καὶ αὐτοὶ μετέρχονται, ἰχνεύοντες δὲ παρ’ ἑαυτῶν ἀνευρίσκειν τὴν τοῦ σφετέρου θεοῦ φύσιν εὐποροῦσι διὰ τὸ συντόνως ἠναγκάσθαι πρὸς τὸν θεὸν βλέπειν, καὶ ἐφαπτόμενοι αὐτοῦ τῇ μνήμῃ ἐνθουσιῶντες ἐξ ἐκείνου λαμβάνουσι τὰ ἔθη καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, καθ’ ὅσον δυνατὸν θεοῦ ἀνθρώπῳ μετασχεῖν· καὶ τούτων δὴ τὸν ἐρώμενον αἰτιώμενοι ἔτι τε μᾶλλον ἀγαπῶσι, κἂν ἐκ Διὸς ἀρύτωσιν ὥσπερ αἱ βάκχαι, ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἐρωμένου ψυχὴν ἐπαντλοῦντες ποιοῦσιν ὡς δυνατὸν ὁμοιότατον τῷ σφετέρῳ θεῷ. [...]
[...]
[ΣΩ. ...] μανίαν γάρ τινα ἐφήσαμεν εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα. ἦ γάρ;
ΦΑΙ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Μανίας δέ γε εἴδη δύο, τὴν μὲν ὑπὸ νοσημάτων ἀνθρωπίνων, τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ θείας ἐξαλλαγῆς τῶν εἰωθότων νομίμων γιγνομένην.
ΦΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Τῆς δὲ θείας τεττάρων θεῶν τέτταρα μέρη διελόμενοι, μαντικὴν μὲν ἐπίπνοιαν Ἀπόλλωνος θέντες, Διονύσου δὲ τελεστικήν, Μουσῶν δ’ αὖ ποιητικήν, τετάρτην δὲ Ἀφροδίτης καὶ Ἔρωτος [...]
Reference Edition: Burnet, Platonis Opera, vol. 2
Translation Source: Emlyn-Jones and Preddy, Lysis et al. (lightly revised)
Source of Date of Work: Emlyn-Jones and Preddy, Lysis et al., xxv
Commentary:
These excerpts from Plato’s Phaidros are included in this collection because they represent the fullest discussion of divine inspiration and possession found in ancient Greek literature. Although the discussion does not relate directly to the particular kind of seizure and possession that was described in the Arimaspeia, it gives some idea of the rich vocabulary that ancient Greeks had for talking about gods acting on or through people.
Short excerpts are also included on the topic of the soul and its relationship to the body, in which Plato (through Sokrates) states his belief that the soul is immortal and naturally able to fly around the heavens when disembodied, but when embodied it tends to lose its ‘wings’ and become trapped in a long cycle of reincarnations, which only philosophical enlightenment can shorten. Such ideas are related to albeit not the same as the Arimaspeia’s portrayal of a disembodied soul escaping from a cataleptic body, flying over and surveying the world, and then returning to and reviving its body.